The Brain as Embodiment of the Virtual

Sarti Alessandro
Barbieri Davide
Language of the article : French
DOI: 10.3406/intel.2018.1884
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In this study we aim to analyse the evolution of differential models of the brain underpinning every activity of perception and cognition. Differential constraints – i.e. distribution of forces, differences and tensions – constitue the virtual of all cognitive morphodynamics and it is actualized in the experience of perception/cognition. Wa are particularly interested in the evolution of models of receptive profiles of primary sensory cortices, starting from the first geometrical models, where they appear as differential operators, continuing with models based on learning techniques, where they appear as convolutional kernels, until theories introducing value-driven conditioning.

By means of the reconstruction of this evolution of the virtual, we will try to understand how neuromathematical models slide towards signification processes, that take place with the embodiment of the virtual. In particular, we analyze a learning model that generates receptive profiles conditioned by stimulus meanings and we pose epistemic questions on the role and limits of modeling in signification processes. The added value of this conception of systemics is dual: with respect to classical semiotic/cognitive studies, the knowledge about material (physical, electrical, biochemical) neural fluxes will offer a new complex substance to which to apply semiotic modulation, allowing to rethink semiosis not anymore on a structural basis but as an embodied process. On the other side with respect to classical cognitive neuroscience studies, a post-cognitive dimension is added, where the subject is not anymore generic but this time is situated, singular, social.

Pour citer cet article :

Sarti Alessandro, Barbieri Davide (2018/1-2). The Brain as Embodiment of the Virtual. In Monier Cyril & Sarti Alessandro (Eds), Neuroscience In The Sciences of Cognition - between Neuroenthusiasm and Neuroskepticism, Intellectica, 69, (pp.347-367), DOI: 10.3406/intel.2018.1884.