It is sometimes believed that the progress of science – and particularly of cognitive science – constitutes a threat for freewill. However, there are various conceptions of free will – or freedom – such that they seem more easily compatible with what science tells us. In fact, it seems that, if one embraces one of these conceptions, scientific progress, to the extent that it grounds new capacities of technological interventions, could make us considerably more free. This would result in a kind of “enhanced freedom”. In this article, I define enhanced freedom, and I try to establish that it is possible in principle. I also examine a few major problems and obstacles for enhanced freedom.
Pour citer cet article :Kammerer François (2021/2). Enhanced Freedom. In Monier Cyril & Khamassi Mehdi (Eds), Liberty and cognition, Intellectica, 75, (pp.137-158), DOI: n/a.