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The enactive conception, developed by the philosopher Alva Noë in his book, Action in Perception, is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. However, I first argue that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action.
Pour citer cet article :Jacob Pierre (2006/1). The Scope and Limits of Enactive Theories of Visual Experience. In Brassac Christian (Eds), Internalism / Externalism, Intellectica, 43, (pp.11-26), DOI: 10.3406/intel.2006.1325.