Enaction as Lived Experience

Petitmengin Claire
Language of the article : French
DOI: 10.3406/intel.2006.1333
Product variations: 


Paper format

to download freely

Can the "first person" point of view help in an assessment of the relevance of the theory of enaction, theory in which the inside and the outside, the knower and the known, the mind and the world, determine each other? On the basis of an exploration of the dynamic micro-structure of lived experience, we suggest some means of tackling this question.

Pour citer cet article :

Petitmengin Claire (2006/1). Enaction as Lived Experience. In Brassac Christian (Eds), Internalism / Externalism, Intellectica, 43, (pp.85-92), DOI: 10.3406/intel.2006.1333.